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ABSTRACT: I present a detailed study and comparison of the views on marriage of J. G. Fichte 
and Søren Kierkegaard, showing both what they have in common and where they differ. I 
argue that, despite claims in recent scholarship that Fichte was the historical model for 
Kierkegaard’s ethical standpoint in Either/Or, there are crucial differences between them, and 
hence that Kierkegaard’s views on marriage must be appreciated as original and important, 
even if influenced by Fichte. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this paper is to retrieve the deep insights on the nature of 
marriage by two profound philosophers, J. G. Fichte and Søren Kierkegaard. Their 
accounts are opposed to the understanding of marriage as a matter of contracts on 
utilitarian grounds. The institution of marriage is in crisis in the United States, though 
the reasons for this are no doubt varied and complex.1 Defenders of marriage have 
touted its benefits: marriage provides an escape from poverty for single young mothers, 
it forces young fathers to take more responsibility, it contributes positively to the health 
and wealth of both parties to the marriage, it keeps adult men from committing crime 
and their children from becoming delinquents.2 Researchers have even touted the 
benefits of marriage to one’s sex life: those who are married have sex more often than 
                                                          
1 For some helpful statistics on the changes in the demographics of marriage, see Finkel, Hui, Carswell, & 
Larson 2014, p. 6 
2 Gerstel & Sarkisian 2006, p. 16 
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unmarried singles!3 These sorts of defenses of marriage tacitly make utilitarian 
assumptions about life and human relationships, assumptions that are in stark contrast 
to the views held by Fichte and Kierkegaard. In this paper, we will do a detailed study 
and comparison of the views on marriage of these two philosophers, showing both 
what they have in common and where they differ. More precisely, in Kierkegaard’s 
case, we present the view of marriage expressed by the character Judge William, who 
is taken to be Kierkegaard’s representative for the ethical life-view. 
The ethical life-view is one of three main life-views that Kierkegaard takes up in 
his pseudonymous works (the others being the aesthetic and the religious) with the goal 
of helping his readers understand what life looks like from this perspective.4 He also 
criticizes each of these life-views in his other pseudonymous works. Taken together, 
these works provide the reader with a sense of the positive aspects as well as the pitfalls 
and failures of those who live an aesthetic, ethical, or religious way of life. 
Kierkegaard’s most comprehensive affirmative articulation of the ethical way of life 
appears in Either/Or, where the character Judge William represents the ethical 
perspective in his communication via two long letters to a young man living an 
aesthetic way of life. The first letter describes Judge William’s views on marriage, while 
the second describes the ethical outlook on life more generally. 
Given that the three main philosophical figures whose attitudes were prevalent in 
19th century Copenhagen were Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that the ethical life-view advocated for by Judge William in Either/Or and 
criticized in Kierkegaard’s other works such as The Sickness unto Death, The Concept of 
Anxiety, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript was described in the writings of at least one 
of these three figures.5 In fact, there is considerable overlap in their writings and ideas, 
making the identification of any one of them as the model for Kierkegaard’s ethicist 
difficult.  
A secondary purpose of this paper is to address, or at least complicate the picture, 
with respect to one possible answer to the question of who is the model for 
Kierkegaard’s ethicist Judge William. Michelle Kosch has powerfully argued that 
Fichte is the best fit as a historical model for Judge William.6 Her arguments focus on 
the ways in which Judge William’s account deviates from the ethics of Kant and 
Hegel, while agreeing in important ways with Fichte’s thesis. I will provide a very brief 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Kosch 2006, p. 261 
5 Kosch 2006, p. 263 
6 Kosch 2006 and Kosch 2015 
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summary of Kosch’s arguments here; readers are encouraged to consult her papers7 
for the rich and intricate case that she makes for her thesis. According to Kosch, the 
judge’s ethics deviates from Kant’s in that (a) the ethical duties that the judge 
advocates for are far wider in scope than those of Kant,8 and (b) the judge’s ethics 
requires an individual to exercise what Kant calls ‘reflective judgment’ (which is 
moving/starting from particular situations to extracting universal principles or laws) as 
opposed to the view that Kant advocates, which is that of ‘determining judgment’ 
(where one applies universal principles that one already possesses to the specific 
situation within which one finds oneself).9 The judge’s ethics deviates from Hegel’s 
Sittlichkeit in (a) the judge’s advocacy of an ethics of conscience, (b) the judge’s rejection 
of existing social norms as the “ultimate arbiter of duty from the individual agent’s 
standpoint”, and (c) the actualization of reason in the modern world.10 On the other 
hand, Fichte’s ethical theory, Kosch argues, comes closest both in terms of matching 
the ethical life-view of the judge and in being the target of the criticisms by characters 
in Kierkegaard’s other pseudonymous works.11 In particular, Judge William is in 
agreement with the following aspects of Fichte’s ethics: (1) theoretical reason is 
dependent on practical reason; the latter standpoint has primacy over the former, (2) 
Fichte’s ethics of conscience, that conscience is the “arbiter of duty”, and (3) Fichte’s 
discussions of the “ethical duty of marriage and the nature of moral evil.”12  
My analysis of Fichte’s and Judge William’s accounts on the nature of marriage 
will suggest that, when it comes to Kosch’s contention (3), the situation is more 
ambiguous than she suggests. I will also examine the autonomy of the institution of 
marriage in Fichte’s and Judge William’s writings and isolate important differences. 
While Kosch provides a brisk account of the ways in which Fichte’s and Judge 
William’s notions of marriage agree,13 a more detailed analysis of their respective 
accounts of marriage is useful for better understanding their places of agreement and 
divergences. While Kosch’s thesis of Fichte as a model for Kierkegaard’s ethicist is 
well-taken from a broad lens of the ethical life-view, the situation is far messier in the 
case of marriage. The German Idealists and Romantics wished to establish, in the 
wake of Kant’s critical philosophy, congruence between love and marriage in a way 
                                                          
7 Kosch 2006 and Kosch 2015 
8 Kosch 2006, pp. 263-264 
9 Kosch 2006, pp. 267-269 
10 Kosch 2006, p. 264 
11 Kosch 2006, p. 265 
12 Kosch 2006, pp. 265-266 
13 Kosch 2006, pp. 271-272 
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that left no remainder term.14 While love is, in this context, individual (isolated, 
natural, momentary), marriage is universal (institutional, conventional, traditional); 
thus, to establish their congruency is very difficult by anthropological, political, or 
historical accounts of marriage, nor is it in keeping with Kant’s critical a priori 
philosophy that was the starting point for these idealists and romantics.15 The main 
approach taken by the idealists and romantics was to create an a priori metaphysical 
account of marriage that in some way claimed that marriage was a process by which 
what had been an a priori whole, that had been broken up into parts (due to, for 
example, original sin or human artifice) was able to reunify; thus marriage is not a new 
“third”16 product that is more or less than the sum of its two parts. Fichte is the 
quintessential example of this. He comes closest to providing an account of the 
metaphysics of marriage that establishes an identity between love and marriage. But 
for Kierkegaard, marriage is not a priori, that is, the unification effected in marriage is 
not an instantiation of a union of some prior metaphysical whole. Kierkegaard’s 
account of marriage also vividly poses the problem of the product (i.e. the nonidentity 
of love and marriage).  
II. FICHTE’S METAPHYSICS OF MARRIAGE: A SYNOPSIS 
In his account of marriage, as articulated in the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant 
does not attempt to justify an inequality of the sexes on metaphysical grounds. For 
Kant, the fact that nature may have created within men and women certain desires 
and inclinations for the perpetuation of the species does not in any way entail a 
necessary relation between the sexes, like the necessity of marriage for the end of 
rearing children, or for the wife to stay home to raise the children while the husband 
goes to work to earn a living.17 Rather, Kant was concerned with the act of sexual 
congress itself, for in it one treats one’s partner as an object for one’s own gratification; 
this objectification of another, not to mention the loss of self that occurs during sex, is 
not in keeping with treating “humanity, whether in [one’s] own person or in the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”18 
Kant sees marriage as a solution to this problem: in the institutionalized relation of 
                                                          
14 Daub 2012, p. 34 
15 Daub 2012, pp. 34-35 
16 Daub 2012, p. 34 
17 Daub 2012, p. 43 
18 Kant 1996, p. 80 
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marriage, the couple, through monogamy, exercise mutual ownership on each other, 
and in this way recover (some of) their dignity.19  
J. G. Fichte was also concerned with, as he perceived it, the loss of dignity that 
occurred in sexual congress, but unlike Kant he did not see this loss as affecting both 
partners equally. Fichte grounds his metaphysics of marriage in his formidable 
theoretical edifice Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, in distinction to Kant who 
grounds his metaphysics of marriage in practical reason; unlike Kant, Fichte is a monist 
and therefore committed to a system that unifies theoretical and practical reason. 
While Kant and Fichte both see a loss of dignity/humanity in the sexual act, they 
locate this loss of dignity in different places.20 For Kant, the loss of dignity is suffered 
by both parties to a sexual act, both the man and the woman are equally diminished. 
But for Fichte, the loss of dignity is not grounded in a categorical imperative of 
practical reason but has to do with the first principle of his Wissenschaftslehre: the self-
positing I. In Fichte’s metaphysics, our senses and our understanding (the latter refers 
to the cognitive apparatus that the subject imposes on what is given) are unified under 
an Absolute I.21 Fichte calls the understanding (which the subject imposes on the 
sensuous manifold) the (relative) I, and the sensory datum that appears given to it, the 
Not-I. In fact, for Fichte, the Not-I is the opposition to the (relative) I within the 
Absolute I, but it is the job of the (relative) I to determine the Not-I.22 So for Fichte, it 
is the job of the understanding to “actively assimilate into our own proper sphere that 
which seems merely given.”23 Thus, the status of human beings is one of “actively 
determining and positing the material world according to our own autonomously 
generated laws.”24 In this sense, for Fichte, the “character of reason is absolute self-
activity.”25 But there is a passivity inherent in sex that violates this imperative of 
activity for human beings, for “mere passivity for its own sake contradicts reason and 
completely annuls it.”26 It is this passivity that directly entails the loss of dignity for the 
woman, but only by extension for the man.27 
                                                          
19 Daub 2012, p. 46 
20 Daub 2012, pp. 44-45 
21 Daub 2012, p. 43 
22 Daub 2012, p. 43 
23 Daub 2012, p. 46 
24 Daub 2012, p. 46 
25 Fichte 2000, p. 266 
26 Fichte 2000, p. 266 
27 Daub 2012, p. 55 
 PRABHU VENKATARAMAN 119 
To explain this passivity, Fichte makes use of the form/matter distinction as 
articulated in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and On the Generation of Animals. According to 
Aristotle, the sperm forms the matter that is the egg into the embryo. Fichte, while 
appealing to this description, implies something different: as Adrian Daub has argued, 
for Fichte the egg stands in for the woman, and the form/matter relation represents 
the penetration involved in sex,28 and it is through sexual intercourse than the woman 
completely submits her entire personality to the man.29 The loss of dignity is tied to the 
sex act itself, rather than to reproduction or conception. But what explains the move 
from the identification of the form/matter relation with the male/female sexual 
relation to the loss of dignity? Here we see that Fichte makes this connection not by 
appeal to any empirical considerations but by appealing to his Wissenschafstlehre: he 
identifies the “I” with the male, and the “Not-I” with the female. The male is thus 
active and is forming the female, who is passive and is being made. Fichte leaves it unclear 
what formation could conceivably mean in this context; rather than any empirical 
considerations Fichte’s attempt to map the male/female and form/matter binaries to 
the I/Not-I seems to stem from his desire to embed his theory of relations between the 
sexes within his Wissenschaftslehre and his theory of human consciousness.30 In any 
case, under his account, a woman consciously seeking “the satisfaction of [her] sexual 
drive as an end” would suffer the loss of her dignity, since she would have “mere 
passivity” as her end;31 on the other hand, man “can acknowledge his sexual drive and 
seek to satisfy it without giving up his dignity.”32 Thus, loss of dignity is directly 
suffered in the sexual act only by the female. Fichte certainly does not claim that 
women are in any sense less than human; indeed, “the two as moral beings are 
supposed to be equal.”33 So for him, the problem to be solved is how a woman can 
retain her dignity despite engaging in sexual intercourse. In describing his solution, he 
notes: 
But now the female's sexual drive, and its expression and satisfaction, 
are indeed part of nature's plan. Thus, the female sexual drive must 
appear in a different form, and - in order to be able to coexist with 
                                                          
28 Daub 2012, p. 51 
29 Fichte 2000, p. 281 
30 Daub 2012, p. 51 
31 Fichte 2000, p. 266 
32 Fichte 2000, p. 268 
33 Fichte 2000, p. 268 
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reason - it must appear even as a drive towards activity, indeed as a 
characteristic natural drive towards an activity unique to this sex.34  
Fichte’s solution is that love, expressed through the institution of marriage, permits a 
woman to recover her dignity.35 Thus, love is “the form under which the sexual drive 
manifests itself in a woman”; it is the “noble, natural drive” that permits her to keep 
her dignity, for it is the basis on which she “freely mak[es] herself into a means.”36  
Before describing how love permits a woman engaged in sexual relations to 
recuperate her dignity, some further comments on Fichte’s mapping of I/Not-I onto 
the male/female and form/matter binaries are in order. Recall that for Fichte, the 
Absolute I is a first principle, one that precedes the (relative) I and the Not-I, and that 
the (relative) I and Not-I are in a relationship of mutual dependence, i.e. the Not-I is a 
position against the I; the Not-I appears as something given to the (relative) I, and it is 
the job of the latter to assimilate the former into it. The end goal of this relation is for 
the (relative) I to effect a complete unification of the Not-I with (or rather, into) itself, 
and in this sense “become identical with the Absolute I.”37 In keeping with his 
metaphysics, Fichte wants to conceive of the relation between the sexes as one of 
mutual dependence, a relationship whose essence (which is a unity) precedes the two 
relata that constitute the relationship, and whose telos is to attain complete unification; 
this is to be accomplished by one relatum determining the other.38 In practice, such 
complete unification is of course impossible, but it serves as a “regulative idea.”39 Thus 
Fichte’s mapping of the I/Not-I to the male/female and form/matter dichotomies 
stems from his view of the importance of the unification effected in marriage: the 
unification of the parties to a marriage is of a piece with the unification of the Not-I 
with the I; in both cases, complete unification results in a whole that sublates any 
differences between the respective relata.40 
For Fichte, the marital relationship begins only and immediately when the 
partners have had sexual intercourse. If intercourse has not occurred, the relationship 
may be anything but not “true marriage,”41 and when it occurs, the couple is 
immediately considered married. Thus, the engagement and the wedding ceremony 
                                                          
34 Fichte 2000, p. 266 
35 Daub 2012, p. 46 
36 Fichte 2000, p. 269 
37 Daub 2012, p. 52 
38 Daub 2012, pp. 52-53 
39 Daub 2012, p. 52 
40 Daub 2012, pp. 52-53 
41 Fichte 2000, p. 281 
 PRABHU VENKATARAMAN 121 
are not essential to the establishment of the marital relation; rather, they fulfill social 
and legal purposes, respectively. 
So, love is of crucial importance in the female, as it is the mechanism that 
safeguards her dignity. Nature provides women with a sex drive, and this drive, as 
described above, entails a loss of “autonomy and dignity,”42 whereas reason insists on 
the equality of men and women. Since the sexual drive in its “natural form” would 
have “completely annulled morality” in a woman, this drive takes a “moral form”: that 
of love.43 Love acts as a dialectic between nature and reason, for love is the woman’s 
sexual drive in a moral guise, and allows a woman to conceive of her surrender to a 
man as activity rather than mere passivity, thus safeguarding her dignity. Love is the 
“innermost point of union between nature and reason”: it is the only place where 
“nature penetrates into reason”, which makes love “the most excellent of all that is 
natural”, and is “the noblest of all natural drives.”44 Love is “innate only to woman” 
and it is through the latter that it “comes to exist among human beings.”45 
The sexual drive does not assume any such guise in a man; it exists in its original 
form and man sees it for what it is. Thus, in man, “love is not an original drive at all, 
but only one that is imparted and derived, one that is developed solely in connection 
with a loving woman.”46 In particular, 
[Man] sees an originally free being freely and with unrestricted trust 
subject herself unconditionally to him. He sees that she makes not 
only all of her external fortune, but also her inner peace of mind and 
her moral character (if not its very existence, then at least her belief in 
it) completely dependent on him: for the woman's belief in herself and 
in her innocence and virtue depends on the fact that she must never 
stop respecting and loving her husband above all others of his sex. Just 
as the moral potential inherent in the woman expresses itself through 
love, so the moral potential inherent in the man expresses itself 
through magnanimity.47 
Thus, the love of a woman for a man evokes within him a feeling of “magnanimity” 
for her, and this interaction between love and magnanimity is the vehicle for the mutual 
surrender of the couple to each other. This works as follows. In her love for the man, 
                                                          
42 Daub 2012, p. 60 
43 Fichte 2000, p. 269 
44 Fichte 2000, p. 269 
45 Fichte 2000, p. 269 
46 Fichte 2000, p. 269 
47 Fichte 2000, p. 271, emphasis added 
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the woman actively surrenders herself—gives of herself—to the man. She cannot do 
this while entertaining the possibility that she may one day stop loving this man, for 
this would mean that either she was only satisfying her sexual drive, or that she was 
“mak[ing] do with the first one to come along,”48 and either way would be dishonoring 
herself. Thus, the woman can surrender herself to the man while maintaining her 
dignity only if she believes that her love “can never end but is eternal”, for “[s]he who 
surrenders herself once, surrenders herself forever.”49 Fichte is at pains to emphasize 
that for the woman to maintain her dignity, her surrender to her partner must be total: 
she surrenders her “personality” and “gives to her beloved everything she has,” her 
“peace depends on her completely subjecting herself to her spouse and having no will 
but his.”50 As suggested before, the emphasis on complete surrender seems to be 
motivated by theoretical considerations, i.e., mapping the male/female relation to the 
(relative) I/Not-I relation, and the imperative of the (relative) I to assimilate into itself 
the Not-I. The man, for his part, recognizes this surrendering of his spouse to him, and 
his “masculine magnanimity” compels him to make this “subjection” as easy for her as 
possible.51 He does this by “discovering her wishes and fulfilling them as if they were 
his own will,” not in the sense of satisfying her “whims and fancies” but in a way that 
allows her to “love her spouse above all else, and of maintaining her innocence in her 
own eyes.”52 The wife, in turn, will reciprocate by working to discover the “higher, 
hidden wishes of her husband and to fulfill them through sacrifices.”53 This mutual 
sacrifice by the two partners for each other gives rise to “marital tenderness,” wherein 
each wishes to “give up [their] own personality so that the personality of the other 
prevails; they each find their satisfaction only in the satisfaction of the other, and the 
exchange of hearts and wills is complete.”54  
Thus, love and magnanimity facilitate a symmetric relationship between the sexes, 
though the relationship still rests on a “natural relation that is explicitly unequal,”55 
i.e., the passivity of the female and the activity of the male. The man’s dignity is not 
really at stake here, and his love is a derivative of the magnanimity that arises from his 
concern for his partner.56  
                                                          
48 Fichte 2000, p. 270 
49 Fichte 2000, pp. 270-271 
50 Fichte 2000, pp. 271-272 
51 Fichte 2000, p. 272 
52 Fichte 2000, p. 272 
53 Fichte 2000, p. 272 
54 Fichte 2000, p. 272 
55 Daub 2012, p. 61 
56 Daub 2012, p. 60 
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Marriage and Monogamy 
This explains the necessity for monogamy by the parties to the marital dyad. Fichte 
notes: 
By its very nature, the marital union is inseparable and eternal, and is 
necessarily entered into as eternal. The woman cannot assume that 
she will ever stop loving her husband more than any other of his sex, 
without forfeiting her feminine dignity; the man cannot assume that 
he will stop loving his wife more than any other of her sex, without 
forfeiting his masculine magnanimity. They give themselves to each 
other forever, because they give themselves to each other 
completely.57  
The love in a woman is difficult to sustain if the woman were to engage in “wanton 
coupling and libertinage,”58 and the man’s desire to safeguard the dignity of the 
woman, motivated as it is by his magnanimous reaction to her love, is compromised if 
he is not monogamous.  
The Telos of Marriage 
With respect to the metaphysical purpose of marriage, Fichte says: “marriage has no 
end other than itself; it is its own end.”59 This statement can be understood in two 
ways.  
(1) Marriage is nature’s vehicle for the perpetuation of the human species, and “the 
satisfaction of the sexual drive” is “the promotion of nature’s end.”60 He notes: 
Nature has grounded her end of reproducing the human species in a 
natural drive that is found in two distinct sexes, a drive that seems to 
exist only for its own sake and to aim at nothing other than its own 
satisfaction. This drive is itself an end of our nature, but for nature it is 
only a means. While human beings aim only at satisfying this drive, 
nature’s end is fulfilled through the natural consequences of such 
satisfaction, without any further help from them.61  
That the sexual drive appears in the woman in the guise of love is nature’s way of 
working with the dictates of reason to achieve its goal, since “it is absolutely contrary 
                                                          
57 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
58 Daub 2012, p. 60 
59 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
60 Fichte 2000, p. 266 
61 Fichte 2000, pp. 264-265 
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to reason to have … mere passivity as its end.”62 Thus, love that leads to marriage 
allows for the protection of women’s dignity, and is the “innermost point of union 
between nature and reason.”63 To be clear, the end goal of marriage is procreation, but 
that of love is the protection of the woman’s dignity. 
(2) The other way to understand the statement that marriage “is its own end”64 is to 
recall Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. The unification effected through marriage is of a piece 
with the general metaphysical project the (relative) I subsuming into itself the Not-I; 
hence Fichte’s statement that the telos of marriage does not lie in any “sensuous 
end.”65 
We should point out that Fichte also believes that marriage is the “most genuine 
mode of existence”66 that nature requires of human beings in that it is only within the 
marital relationship that we are able to fully develop as humans. In the unmarried 
state, the “most remarkable aspects of humanity remain uncultivated.”67 In particular, 
he writes: 
It is only in union with a loving woman that the masculine heart opens 
itself to love, to a love that gives of itself without restraint, and loses 
itself in its object; it is only in marital union that the woman learns 
magnanimity, conscious self-sacrifice in accordance with concepts: 
and thus with each passing day of their marriage the union becomes 
more intimate.68  
Thus, marriage is a necessary condition for us to realize other (non-sensual) aspects of 
ourselves. But this is an important result of marriage, not it's a priori telos. 
Hence the telos of marriage is two-fold: unification and procreation. 
Marriage and the State 
For Fichte, the role of the state with respect to marriage is to protect the dignity of its 
citizens. This means, in particular, that the state must ensure that all marriages are 
entered into with “absolute freedom,”69 that there has been no coercion involved (by 
force or persuasion) by either partner, their parents, or other parties. This is especially 
                                                          
62 Fichte 2000, p. 266 
63 Fichte 2000, p. 269 
64 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
65 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
66 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
67 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
68 Fichte 2000, pp. 272-273 
69 Fichte 2000, p. 278 
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true in the case of the female. An “inexperienced and innocent” daughter who does 
not understand love or the arranged relationship being proposed to her is subject to 
manipulation by her parents or relatives, and can easily be “cheated and used as a 
means” for their end.70 Cheating a woman for the entire duration of her life out of love 
(“the noblest and sweetest of sentiments”), her dignity and “her entire character”, and 
degrading her to the “status of a tool” is morally abhorrent, and the state must exercise 
“stringent laws and careful supervision” to protect her against this or any other type of 
coercion.71 The problem of coercion does not arise to the same extent in the case of 
the man. For Fichte, there is no question of harsh or violent coercion being used on a 
man to force him to marry, for since marriage is congruent with sexual consummation, 
and the man cannot be forced into such consummation (for “that contradicts the very 
nature of the matter”72), the issue does not arise. Nor is it a problem if the man is 
persuaded to marry a specific woman, for under Fichte’s metaphysics of marriage the 
man’s love, i.e., marital magnanimity and tenderness, does not arise before marriage, 
but “only as a result of it.”73 Thus, the role of the state is primarily to protect “freedom 
in marriage”, especially in the case of women; outside of this function, the state “must 
recognize and certify every marriage its citizens enter into.”74 
The Wedding Ceremony and the Clergy 
We have seen that the state has the important function of safeguarding the freedom of 
marriage. Concretely, this entails making sure that the female party to the marriage 
has not been coerced in any way and that she has “given herself with a free will, out of 
love.”75 In keeping with this function, the state must require all male citizens who wish 
to enter into marriage to prove to it the absence of coercion. But there is no 
“appropriate” way for the man to prove such absence; the best he can do is let his 
fiancée “legally declare her free consent.”76 This occurs during the wedding ceremony. 
For Fichte, when the bride declares ‘I do,’ she “says nothing more than that she has 
not been coerced”; that the man has not been coerced is demonstrated “by his leading 
the wife to the wedding ceremony.”77 The man’s ‘I do’ serves a different, albeit still a 
legal, function. As we saw before, on Fichte’s account of marriage, the wife must “for 
                                                          
70 Fichte 2000, p. 277 
71 Fichte 2000, p. 277 
72 Fichte 2000, p. 278 
73 Fichte 2000, p. 278 
74 Fichte 2000, p. 279, emphasis added 
75 Fichte 2000, p. 279 
76 Fichte 2000, p. 279 
77 Fichte 2000, p. 279 
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the sake of her honor”78 completely subject herself to her husband’s will. For Fichte, 
this means that she “does not belong to herself but to her husband,” and therefore 
upon marriage the state “ceases to regard the wife as a juridically distinct person.”79 In 
other words: “In the eyes of the state, her husband becomes her guarantee and her 
legal guardian; in all things, he lives out her public life, and she retains only a domestic 
life.”80 The man’s ‘I do’ in the wedding ceremony is a formal “declaration” and 
“assurance” of this guarantee.81 
Since Fichte grounds his account of marriage in morality (in particular, the 
protection of dignity), he finds that it is reasonable that people may wish to have their 
wedding under the auspices of a church or another religious authority.82 But the role of 
the church is to educate people on the divine law, not to coerce them into obeying it.83 
Hence, for a wedding to be considered legally valid, the clergy’s role is one of a clerical, 
but not moral, officer of the state.84 Marriage derives its legitimacy from the specific 
physical and emotional comportments of the partners towards each other, not from 
any legal or theological authority. The presence of a priest at a wedding, in addition to 
his clerical function, serves as a reminder of the moral nature of marriage, nothing 
more. 
Divorce and the State 
For Fichte, the essence of marriage is the existence of a specific sexual relationship 
between the man and the woman, one that is characterized by “boundless love on the 
part of the woman and boundless magnanimity on the part of the man.”85 If either of 
these features (love or magnanimity) ceases to exist in the relationship, then the 
relationship is no longer one of marriage. Since it would be unreasonable for the state 
to force “persons whose hearts have grown apart to continue to love together,”86 it 
must not play an obstructionist role in cases of divorce; rather, it must only require, for 
juridical purposes, that divorces be declared to it. 
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Marriage and Children 
Next, we will look at Fichte’s account on the role of children in his metaphysics of 
marriage. According to Fichte, the mother possesses a natural drive, an instinct, to 
care for her child’s “physical preservation.”87 But in all “intelligent beings,”88 drives are 
filtered through their consciousness. Therefore, this natural protective instinct of the 
mother, after mediation by her consciousness, manifests itself as “sympathy.”89 Thus, 
the mother’s bond with her child is biological, but through the mechanism of 
consciousness, this bond is “transfigured”90 into sympathy and compassion, and hence 
a sense of duty towards her child. The father, by contrast, does not feel a biologically 
grounded bond with his child; his compassion for his child is part of a universal drive, 
inherent in human nature, “to take care of (and even show affection for) the weak and 
helpless”, and as such “the father has no reason to show any preference for his child”, 
his drive “will speak out on behalf of every child”.91 Rather, the reason that the father 
still loves and cares for his child more than any other is “his tenderness for the 
mother.”92 In other words, the magnanimity and marital tenderness of the husband for 
his wife entails that “the father makes every wish and end of the mother his own”; 
therefore, the mother’s concern for her child becomes “by transference” the father’s 
concern as well, “for the two are one subject, and their will is only one will.”93 As 
Adrian Daub puts it: “The particularization of the father’s care is thus made possible 
only by the merging of the two parental subjects into one through love.”94 
Fichte’s Legacy 
Fichte’s metaphysics of marriage served as a crucial intellectual legacy for an entire 
generation of idealists and romantics, including Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Sophie 
Mereau, Jean Paul, Hegel, Novalis, and Franz von Baader. Adrian Daub has isolated 
three ways in which Fichte’s theory set the terrain for these thinkers with regard to the 
metaphysics of marriage95: 
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1. In contrast to the individualized, atomistic conception of people 
prevalent from the Enlightenment, Fichte emphasized the communal 
structure of the marital institution: the marital unit “had priority over the 
particulars related to it.”96 Men and women were “destined to be unified 
and were woefully incomplete when they lived outside of loving 
couples.”97 
2. Fichte’s theory preserved the autonomy of marriage, which was grounded 
solely in the emotions of the couple for each other. Thus, any unwelcome 
interference in the institution of marriage, whether familial, legal, or 
religious, was illegitimate. As a unified whole, marriage possessed its own 
“normative structure”, was still “binding” and possessed dignity 
independent of any familial, legal, or theological grounding.98 
3. Fichte’s metaphysical deduction of marriage attempts to explain how 
consciousness (the self-positing I and its interaction with the Not-I) and 
erotic relationships are connected; unlike Kant, his deduction is not 
grounded in a “practical philosophy.”99 Thus, Fichte’s approach to 
marriage raised important questions for other idealists and romantics to 
grapple with. For instance, once the marital unit has been formed by the 
consent of the two parties, it would possess its own “autonomy, 
spontaneity, and dignity”100: how would these features of the marital unit 
interact with the corresponding features of the individual relata that 
constitute it? As far as Fichte was concerned, once the partners stopped 
feeling (love/magnanimity) for each other, the marriage was over; 
otherwise marriage would become the kind of legalistic, theocratic, or 
familial institution that ran contrary to his metaphysical grounding of 
marriage in dignity and autonomy. Other romantics and idealists wanted 
a justification for marriage that was (a) more than the preservation of 
dignity given our sexual natures, while (b) still preserving its autonomy. 
III. THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE IN THE ETHICAL STANDPOINT OF 
EITHER/OR 
In this section, we will describe, in some detail, Judge William’s views on the nature of 
marriage, as he articulates them in Either/Or. Judge William, in responding to the 
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aesthete A, is seeking to demonstrate the “aesthetic meaning of marriage”101 and how 
this aesthetic can be sustained through life’s challenges. For Judge William, being in a 
marital relationship is the “most beautiful task given to a human being.”102 It is in such 
a relationship that even what is accidental in life, such as a flaw in the physical features 
of one’s partner, attains a beautiful significance; “every feeling, every mood, gains a 
higher meaning”103 in this shared consciousness. 
Marriage, for Judge William, is a stable relationship in which the two parties are 
able to continuously rejuvenate their first love, and in a way that is both ethical and 
religious. It is an activity in so far as such rejuvenation is not just a living in the past, 
and it is quintessentially Christian when it is able to combine the “erotic of 
paganism”104 with the commitment of marriage. Marriage, in its highest form, is not 
only an ethical but also a religious institution; in this regard, Judge William’s view of 
marriage differs fundamentally from that of Fichte’s. What makes the “first flash”105 of 
love aesthetic is that it will go to any extent, confront any obstacle, in order to obtain 
the object of its desire; indeed, it is in opposition to external difficulties that this 
immediate romantic love is really seen to shine. But this love, in its immediate intensity, 
and its willingness to battle against all for the sake of the beloved, is acting from an 
abstract conception of love.106 This is not to say that the person in the throws of 
romantic love does not feel it intensely, or is acting in response to something which is 
not sensual; Judge William makes it clear that the power and immediacy of romantic 
love is grounded in beauty that is either sensual or which can be expressed through the 
sensual.107 Rather, while in romantic love, the individual understands love to be 
everlasting, unchanging, constant, and static.108 Such a conception of love is abstract in 
that it fails to recognize “love’s proper dialectic,”109 its internal struggles, and its 
relation to the ethical and the religious life. Since such a love has not gone undergone 
any internal ordeal, or found its justification in something higher than the sensual, it 
may well turn out to be illusory.110  
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Romantic love attains its beauty from its courage in the face of external 
opposition, and its nobility from its assimilation of a “consciousness of the eternal”111 
into itself; if it does not do the latter, and remains grounded only in the sensual, then it 
is lust and not love. The sensual, however, powers the intense nature of romantic love, 
for romantic love does not arise from some deliberative thought-process; indeed, “in its 
genius, romantic love is free and that precisely […] constitutes its greatness.”112  
For Judge William, as for Fichte, the very “substance”113 of marriage is love. As he 
sees it, the notion that marriage leads to the development of erotic love, as opposed to 
presupposing it, really comes out of certain customs, where “people of limited 
understanding” who “think they have had experience […] [think] that their children 
also ought to have [the same] experience.”114 In addition, any belief that attempts to 
separate romantic love and marriage, and that does so on the basis that marriage 
enervates romantic love and that the latter “presumably would be able to battle 
through life victoriously if it were permitted to […] depend upon itself alone”115 is 
misguided in at least two ways: first, it fails to appreciate that the “sensuous element” 
of erotic love has its moral expression in marriage, and second, it is “unbeautiful” from 
the religious point of view, since those who while holding this view enter into marriage 
are attempting to “sneak into something” for which they don’t think they need God’s 
help, and then turn to him only later at times of hardship.116 Thus, according to Judge 
William, marriage presupposes love and does so “not as something past but as 
something present.”117 In addition, this love should include what is inherent in genuine 
love--a consciousness of the eternal, otherwise marriage is nothing but a civil contract. 
The Nature of First Love 
The first love of an individual is crucial to their spiritual development.118 For those who 
have been in love once, if they are fortunate, then regardless of whether the 
relationship has worked out, for them this first love is always in the present and never 
dies out. What Judge William means by this is that the experience of first love for the 
fortunate individual has “the promise of the future” and is the motor that powers their 
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lives, it is the “motivating, the infinite impulse” in their lives and is ever present in its 
“continual unfolding and rejuvenating” effects.119 In this sense, the experience of first 
love “is also the second, the third, the last” and has “the qualification of eternity.”120 
The fortunate individual who is reflective focuses on the eternal nature of love, which 
in turn only strengthens the power of love for them; the unfortunate individual focuses 
on the temporality of love, and this only weakens the power of love for them.121 Judge 
William puts this most vividly when he says: “For the person who reflects temporally, 
the first kiss, for example, will be a past […]; for the person who reflects eternally, 
there will be an eternal possibility.”122 Thus, first love is “the highest earthly good”123 
that could be bestowed upon a person. 
First love has a dual nature—it is both sensual and eternal.124 It is, as is the case 
with all forms of love, “a unity of freedom and necessity.”125 The individual feels an 
irresistible attraction to the other and yet in this very attraction feels energized and 
empowered.126 This unity of freedom and necessity resides in the individual immediately 
(i.e., not from reflection)127; in this he feels “the possession of everything he is.”128 So, 
the two lovers are pulled towards each other by the “irresistible power” of first love, 
and “yet they enjoy therein their complete freedom.”129 
It is here that we see the importance of the religious element that is inherent in 
Judge William’s ethical standpoint. In his role as the defender of marriage, Judge 
William takes as an assumption that the two lovers are religious. Thus, given their 
religious development, he reasonably points out that it would be perfectly natural for 
them, in their happiness, to want to thank God for the gift of love.130 Since this desire 
to give thanks is born of gratefulness (as opposed to a fear of the unknown, or the 
future and its trials, or even sheer insecurity concerning the eternal nature of love), the 
love of the two partners is not altered or corrupted in their desire to give thanks to 
God and to do so by formally affirming their relationship (through marriage) in front 
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of Him (in a church). By so doing, the partners have allowed love to be lifted into the 
higher concentric spheres of the ethical and the religious, and in a way that hasn’t 
weakened the power of their romantic love (Kierkegaard 1987, 48). Indeed, the act of 
thanksgiving in the church is not passive, but is “united with an element of work,” in 
that it is accompanied by a mandate to do the work required internally “to hold fast to 
this love.”131 
The Telos of Marriage 
In describing Judge William’s views on the purpose of marriage, it is important to 
distinguish between (a) the phenomenological ‘why’ of marriage, i.e., why an 
individual chooses to get married to a specific partner, (b) the ‘why’ of marriage more 
generally—the reasons why an individual might want to get married at all, and (c) the 
benefits that result from getting married to one’s love. 
When it comes to the phenomenological ‘why,’ Judge William is very clear: “[I]t is 
always an insult to a girl to want marry her for any other reason than that one loves 
her.”132 The actual ‘why’ of marriage becomes clear only in hindsight: that marriage 
possesses a beautiful “inner harmony” in its unity of opposites, and therefore “has its 
teleology in itself”.133 But if one decides to get married after having calculated all the 
‘whys’ of marriage (as opposed to having experienced them, which comes only after 
marriage), then they are getting married for all the wrong reasons. Indeed, the “less 
‘why’ the more love”; one feels the need to commit to the one that one loves and this 
‘reason’ “has in it an infinite energy and power.”134 But any finite list of ‘whys’—like 
marriage “is a school for character,”135 “to have children […] for propagating the 
human race,”136 or “to have a home”137 are the result of misunderstanding the nature 
of marriage, and will eventually result in disillusionment. This is not to say that these 
things are not benefits of marriage; rather that they can’t be why one chooses to get 
married in the first place. This is the distinction between (a) and (b) in the previous 
paragraph: the former arises out of, and is grounded in love for one’s partner; the 
other is abstract in character and arises from a misunderstanding of marriage. For 
Judge William, there isn’t such an a priori purpose to marriage (other than to commit to 
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one’s partner); the conferring of dignity, the building of character, having a home, and 
children are goods that result from marriage but are not and cannot be the basis for 
marriage. 
But Judge William does describe (c) (i.e., the benefits that result from marriage) in 
some detail. According to Judge William: 
1. Marriage provides a “sense of meaning” and the “weight of responsibility” 
that matures one’s soul.138 The responsibility of having a home (i.e., a 
family) gives one both “security and joy”139 and is a blessing. 
2. Marriage disciplines the man by making him modest; his wife is his 
“conscience”140 and as a result of her influence he is ennobled. In addition 
(and we see here, as in other places, that Judge William is a product of his 
time), a man’s wife can deal with “minutiae”, something that is very difficult 
for the man, while woman “is created to deal with little matters and knows 
how to give them a meaning, a value, a beauty that enchants.”141 Also, just 
as the man’s pride is softened by his wife, her weakness is offset by her 
“leaning on him.”142  
3. A person realizes their positive freedom only through marriage. The 
freedom inherent in first love is of the soul, but the individual has not yet 
“purified itself” from the apparent shackles of “natural necessity.”143 This, of 
course, does not mean that the individual is no longer subject to the laws of 
causality. What Judge William means is that a complete awareness of the 
extent of one’s freedom does not come prior to the presence of the religious 
sphere in the relationship. Once married, the religious frees the individuals: 
from pride (in the case of the man), and excessive humility (in the case of 
the woman), and mediates their relationship in a way that allows the now 
self-possessed individuals to give of themselves to their partner with an 
“exuberance”144 that they’d never suspected they possessed, and to receive 
from their partner as well. Judge William puts this powerfully when he says: 
[I]t is marriage that first gives a person his positive freedom, because 
this relationship can extend over his whole life, over the least as well as 
the greatest. It frees him from a certain unnatural embarrassment in 
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natural things, which probably can be acquired in many other ways, 
but then also very easily at the expense of the good; it frees him from 
stagnating in habit by maintaining a fresh current; it frees him from 
people precisely by binding him to one human being.145  
 
4. With regard to children, the situation is similar as with marriage in that one 
does not enter into parenthood (at least solely) on the basis of calculation or 
“stud-consideration[s].”146 Rather, the blessings of children are only apparent a 
posteriori. Of all the effects that children produce in their parents, the religious 
effect--that “children are a blessing”, a gift from God--is the most beautiful, 
and every father will recognize “in humility that [the child] is a trust and that 
in the most beautiful sense of the word he is only the stepfather.”147 Also, 
children teach the parents humility, and about duty, responsibility, and what 
we owe to our own parents; a parent is connected by their child to both the 
“past and a future.”148 
In conclusion, for Judge William, in order for marriage to be “esthetic and 
religious,” there can be no a priori, metaphysical, or “finite why” for marriage.149 
Rather, it is during the course of marriage that one discovers its “whys” “in all its 
blessedness.”150 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY 
The marriage ceremony is the essential expression of the ethical and religious elements 
of marriage; these elements separate marital love from first love.151 Judge William 
points out that the wedding ceremony is a reminder to the partners that their singular 
romantic love possesses within it the universal; it does so by taking the couple back to 
the first parents (Adam and Eve) and expressing to them: “You also are a couple just 
like them; the same event is being repeated here in you, and you are also standing here 
alone [...] in the presence of God."152 In reminding the couple that they possess in their 
union the "universally human,”153 the wedding ceremony is also a reminder of original 
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sin. However, this is no reason for embarrassment or awkwardness; such feelings are 
the result of a misunderstanding. Judge William says: "To wish that sin had never 
entered the world is to lead mankind back to the more imperfect. Sin has come in, but 
when individuals have humbled themselves under this, they stand higher than they 
stood before."154 
In the final step of the wedding ceremony, the church requires the partners to take 
a vow. The more free the individuals are to 'surrender' their freedom (in taking the 
vow of commitment), the more "esthetically beautiful is the marriage."155 Indeed, it is 
in this surrendering of their freedom that the man and woman are set free to each 
other and from the world, it is now, going forward, that they will realize their positive 
freedom.156 
ADVERSITY AND THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF MARRIAGE 
A central feature that distinguishes marital love from romantic love is the historical 
nature of the former. Just as a history of one’s faith is not an enumerated list of great 
‘works’ that one does (e.g. public miracles), but rather is the “appropriation of faith in 
personal life,”157 so too is it the case with marital love: it is historical in that it is 
assimilated into the daily life of the individual, as opposed to romantic love which is 
‘famous’ for the overcoming of external trials, but is not necessarily internalized in the 
existing daily life of the individual in the same way. Marital love’s history is that of 
appropriating love internally, and its intentional stance prepares it to “fight together 
with God for itself”, and to “gain itself in patience.”158 This intentional stance both 
posits the existence of obstacles but also naturally assumes that (with God’s help) these 
obstacles will be overcome, for these obstacles are conceived of by this comportment as 
inner trials, which marital love undoubtedly has the resources to fight. The historical 
nature of marital love lies in the actual occurrence of these obstacles and in their being 
overcome, so that “love, tested and purified, issues from this movement and assimilates 
what is experienced.”159 
The mechanism of this overcoming is one where the external or “outer” trial is 
transformed into an “inner” trial.160 As Judge William explains, the primary question 
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for the married man “is not one of where I am going to find the money and at what 
percent but first and foremost is of my love, [whether] I have kept a pure and faithful 
covenant of love with her to whom I am united.”161 While the transforming of an outer 
trial into an inner one is by no means easy, the ability of one to do this signals whether 
he or she has “triumphed” over their adversity and “preserved the esthetic in his 
marriage.”162 
A necessary condition for marital love to flourish is that the partners live together 
in “good understanding.”163 This means living together in a spirit of “frankness, 
uprightness, openness on the largest scale possible”164; here secretiveness towards the 
other is the death of marital love. Judge William paints a vivid picture of this shared 
marital consciousness by contrasting it with the aesthete’s conception of romantic love: 
the latter believes that “love will cease when the mystery is gone; … [while Judge 
William believes] that it does not begin until that is gone”; the aesthete maintains that 
one’s partner should always remain something of a mystery, and that “the 
incommensurable [is] an absolutely vital ingredient,” whereas Judge William believes 
that “a person does not truly love until he knows what he loves.”165 The aesthete’s 
position is emblematic of a failure to understand the historical character of marital 
love. The historical in marriage is not simply the sum of the external events or joint 
experiences but is rather the inner movement, the inner development, under “divine 
auspices”166 of the couple’s shared consciousness. As Judge William notes, in the case of 
an individual life: 
When a person has arrived at an understanding of himself, has had 
the courage to be willing to see himself, it by no means thereby follows 
that the story is now past history, for now it begins, now for the first 
time it gains its real meaning, in that every single experienced moment 
is led back to this total view.167 
Marriage begins with the shared knowledge of the marital partners, and every 
“particular detail is led back” to this “joint marital consciousness”, and in this lies the 
happiness of marriage.168 Secrecy between the partners leads to the destruction of 
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marital love; it is through “honesty, frankness, openness, [and] understanding”169 that 
the sensual and the spiritual are united in marital love, thus making marriage both 
ethical and beautiful. 
IV. COMPARISONS BETWEEN FICHTE’S AND JUDGE WILLIAM’S 
CONCEPTIONS ON THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE 
The Telos of Marriage 
We begin by noting that Fichte provides a genuine metaphysics of marriage: his account 
of marriage, congruent as it is with sexual intercourse, argues that marriage has two a 
priori teloi: (1) nature’s goal of “reproducing the human species in a natural drive,”170 
and (2) the (attempt at) complete unification of the man and woman, which in itself is a 
special case of the (relative) I assimilating the Not-I into itself to create a product which 
is more than the sum of its two elements, something that reflects the Absolute-I.171 
Judge William’s account, to the contrary, rejects any such a priori telos to marriage. He 
does agree that the erotic is an essential component to marriage, since marriage for 
him is a transfiguration of romantic love, in that marriage incorporates the ethical and 
religious along with the erotic. But his detailed description of the anatomy of marital 
life, ostensibly offered to an aesthete who fails to understand the inner workings of 
both marital love and marital life, is also a critique of a priori notions of unification. For 
Judge William, such notions are instantiations of abstract conceptions of love that are 
not sufficiently derived from human experience, and hence fail to resonate with the 
actual experiences of marital life. He even notes: 
Over the centuries have not knights and adventurers experienced 
incredible toil and trouble in order to find quiet peace in a happy 
marriage; over the centuries have not writers and readers of novels 
labored through one volume after another to end with a happy 
marriage […] ? [T]he corruption, the unhealthiness in these books [is] 
that they end where they should begin. … The defect is that this 
battle, this dialectic, is completely external and that love emerges from 
this battle just as abstract as when it entered into it.172 
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Judge William instead gives an account of marriage that emphasizes the “inner 
history”173 and dialectical nature of marital love. This is not just a difference in 
emphasis, i.e., it is not the case that the differences between Fichte’s account and Judge 
William’s are simply because Fichte describes the metaphysics and Judge William 
describes the quotidian, and the two accounts are therefore compatible. Rather, Judge 
William is opposed to abstractions when it comes to the nature of love; he even chides 
the aesthete for his tendency to abstraction: “You pursue every mood, every idea, good 
or bad, happy or sad, to its outermost limit, but in such a way that it happens more in 
abstracto than in concreto,” the problem being that “nothing more results than a 
knowledge of it” but the kind of knowledge that does not enable the aesthete to act; in 
modern parlance, we would call this ‘paralysis by analysis.’174  
We should note here that both Fichte and Judge William use similar language in 
some places when they state the telos of marriage. In particular, Fichte states that 
marriage “is its own end.”175 By this he means that the “marital relation is the most 
genuine mode of existence, as required by nature, for adult human beings of both 
sexes”, for it is only in this relation that we can develop all of our “human faculties”; 
indeed, our “most remarkable aspects” “remain uncultivated” outside marriage.176 In 
other words, the purpose of marriage cannot be some “sensuous end.”177 When Judge 
William says that marriage “has its teleology in itself,”178 he means only that the ‘why’ 
of marriage is not something that can be theorized about, and is something that can 
genuinely understood only in hindsight, after a person has been married. Any 
calculation of the ‘why’ of marriage is misguided, and the only reason to marry 
someone is because one loves him or her. 
For Fichte, his metaphysics informs the way in which he understands the workings 
of actual marital life. That Judge William is skeptical about speculative philosophy is 
what makes not just the differences but also the similarities in their accounts so 
interesting. We turn to these similarities and differences next. 
The Ennobling Role of Marriage  
Both Fichte and Judge William see the institution of marriage as ennobling the erotic 
love that the partners have for each other. In Fichte’s account, the sexual drive takes 
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the form of love in the female, and by allowing her to interpret (what Fichte sees as) 
her passivity as activity, allows her to maintain her dignity. In the man, love, though 
not an innate drive as with the woman, is created in the man through his 
magnanimity, a magnanimity which is produced in reaction to receiving the love and 
surrender of the female. The resulting relationship is one filled with “marital 
tenderness” and there is a complete “exchange of hearts and wills” between the 
partners.179 The two partners “give themselves to each other forever, because they give 
themselves to each other completely.”180 A sexual relationship between the lovers is 
thus transformed into a relationship that is founded on mutual love and commitment, 
and where “each [can] find their satisfaction only in the satisfaction of the other.”181 
Similarly, for Judge William, the eroticism inherent in romantic love can be expressed 
morally only in marriage,182 and a love that is grounded in the merely sensual that does 
not possess some “consciousness of the eternal”183 is merely lust. But in marriage “the 
sensuous is by no means repudiated but is ennobled.”184  
Another view that Fichte and Judge William share is their opposition to arranged 
marriages. We have seen that for Judge William, romantic love is a necessary 
prerequisite to marriage, and that a consciousness of the eternal is a necessary 
characteristic of romantic love. Hence, marriages based solely on “commonsensical 
calculations” such as family alliances, income, social status, etc. are for Judge William 
both “immoral and fragile.”185 Similarly, for Fichte, arranging a marriage for a woman 
(or coercing her into one) is to cheat her out of the “noblest and sweetest of 
sentiments” (namely, love) and to reduce her to the “status of a tool.”186 Fichte, unlike 
Judge William, isn’t troubled by an arranged marriage because of it might violate the 
man’s rights, since under Fichte’s account, love in a man is something that emerges in 
response to a woman’s love. But both thinkers ground their opposition to arranged 
marriages on the principle that love should be the determining factor when deciding to 
marry. 
Both Fichte and Judge William agree that important virtues can only be realized 
by men and women within a marital relationship, and that as single individuals we are 
incomplete versions of ourselves. Fichte notes that it is “only in union with a loving 
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woman that the masculine heart opens itself to love […] that gives of itself without 
restraint”, and it is “only in marital union that a woman learns magnanimity [and] 
conscious self-sacrifice in accordance with concepts.”187 Judge William includes an 
explanation in his account of how this giving of oneself to another occurs: it is in 
marriage that a person realizes their “positive freedom” and keeps them from 
“stagnating in habit”188; the religious nature of marriage frees a man from pride and 
the woman from excessive humility, allowing them to give to and receive from each 
other in a way that they’d never suspected.189 
Both Fichte and Judge William point out that a couple entering a marital union do 
so with the expectation that their union will be forever. But what is it that leads them 
to believe when they are entering a marriage that their union will be everlasting? 
Fichte writes: “They give themselves to each other forever, because they give 
themselves to each other completely,”190 and Judge William notes that that a temporal 
notion of love would lead one to expect a marriage where the couple “live each day as 
though [it] was the decisive day, […] as if one were up for examination every day.”191 
But on Judge William’s account, both the man and the woman are in love with each 
other and so it is not surprising that they expect that they will be together forever. But 
according to Fichte, love is innate only in the woman, and the man’s love for the 
woman grows out of his magnanimity in response to her love. Thus, either the man’s 
love must occur prior to the couple consummating their marriage, for otherwise it is 
not clear that the man, from his state of ‘magnanimity’ would believe that his marriage 
to the woman would be everlasting; or, the man, in his magnanimity, feels an ethical 
imperative to fully commit to the woman who is in love with him, and so his 
expectation that his marriage will last forever is grounded in his own ethics and not in 
his inchoate love for his partner. 
We can also ask: what is it that sustains this love that the partners have for each 
other? Here, an important difference emerges. We saw above that Judge William 
provides a powerful account of the inner history of a marital relationship, where the 
religious nature of marriage and of the couple provides them with an intentional 
stance that sees any potential obstacles that they might face as having already been 
overcome, and with each such actual overcoming, “love, tested and purified” emerges 
                                                          
187 Fichte 2000, pp. 272-273 
188 Kierkegaard 1987, p. 67fn 
189 Kierkegaard 1987, p. 61 
190 Fichte 2000, p. 274 
191 Kierkegaard 1987, p. 26 
 PRABHU VENKATARAMAN 141 
stronger and having “assimilate[ed] what is experienced.”192 Within the marital 
relationship, a beautiful “joint marital consciousness” is created to which each 
“particular detail is led back, and therein lies its happiness.”193 Fichte, on the other 
hand, writes: “They give themselves to each other forever, because they give 
themselves to each other completely,”194 but this doesn’t seem to be much of an 
explanation. Fichte would presumably agree with Judge William that the inner history 
of a strong marital love is what maintains and strengthens a marriage. But Fichte does 
not see religion as an essential ingredient to a marriage, whereas for Judge William this 
inner history is lived out by the partners in the state of romantic love, as well as from 
ethical and religious imperatives. 
Autonomy and Religion in Marriage 
For Fichte, marriage is a natural, moral, and autonomous institution: it is grounded in 
the feelings that the partners have toward each other (love and magnanimity), but not 
in familial arrangements, law, or theology. For Judge William, marriage, is a distinctly 
religious institution. As Judge William repeatedly emphasizes, the powerful immediacy 
of romantic love often creates or reflects a consciousness of the eternal within the two 
partners, and they may be completely convinced that once united, they will be 
together forever. But for Judge William, this commitment can be realized only when 
the erotic can be assimilated into the ethical and religious spheres. In the process of 
this assimilation, the marriage receives the absolute stamp of eternity, and along with 
it, the ethical and religious imperative to sustain marital love, especially in times of 
adversity: “duty is precisely the divine nourishment [that] love needs.”195 Thus, for 
Fichte, the product of marriage is a self-contained and self-sustaining unit, while for 
Judge William, a marriage can be sustained only if the partners are also in a 
relationship with God.  
This is also demonstrated by the different purposes that Fichte and Judge William 
see for the wedding ceremony. Recall that for Fichte, it is not essential that a priest or 
other religious figure be present at the ceremony, for the main purpose of the 
ceremony is for the woman to declare that she has not been coerced into the wedding, 
and for the man to declare that he will be his wife legal guarantor; this was the 
meaning of the ‘I do’ that each declares in the ceremony. Judge William, on the other 
hand, places central importance on having a Christian church authority present for 
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the ceremony. It is a reminder to the couple that (a) their marriage is taking place 
before God, and (b) that their union, though unique, represents the “universally 
human,”196 as has been the case going back to the first couple, Adam and Eve. The 
religious setting serves to humble the man before God and reminds him that the 
wedding is the beginning of a lifelong responsibility to care for his beloved, and not the 
culmination of a conquest; it also reminds the woman that she is not alone in her 
marriage with her husband, but that God is with her, and this will help protect her 
from becoming a mere instrument of her husband’s whims. The church setting also 
serves to remind the couple of original sin. But according to Judge William, the 
woman will not feel any shame or embarrassment at being called or considered a 
sinner, for her entire existence is bound up in the “earthly love” she feels toward her 
husband; indeed, for her to be convinced that “earthly love is a sin at all” would result 
in “her whole existence … [being] annihilated at its deepest root.”197 Here we have 
powerful echoes of Fichte’s metaphysics: for Fichte, love is the guise under which the 
woman’s sexual drive appears to her and allows her to perceive her subjection to her 
husband as activity rather than passivity, it is a mechanism for preserving the dignity 
of the woman in her own eyes. While this role of love in the two accounts (i.e., in 
Fichte’s account, allowing the woman to maintain her dignity, and in Judge William’s 
account, the denial by the woman that earthly love is a sin) are similar, the respective 
contexts in which love plays this role are different. In Fichte’s account, nature is 
working to protect the woman’s dignity, which reason insists is compromised by her 
passivity; in Judge William’s account, nature (i.e., how the woman feels towards her 
partner) is working to protect the woman’s dignity (by denying that her earthly love is 
a sin), which might be perceived as being under attack by the “Church’s solemn 
declaration that sin has entered into the world.”198  
We now turn to a comparison of how children are perceived within Fichte’s and 
Judge William’s accounts of marriage. Recall that for Fichte, the mother’s sympathy 
and compassion for her child is in fact the nature-given instinct for the physical 
preservation of her child after that instinct has been filtered through her consciousness. 
The father’s love for his child is not biologically grounded in the same way; he has a 
general compassionate instinct for all helpless beings and this compassion is channeled 
into a preferential concern for his own child due to his love for the child’s mother. 
Judge William, in his account, does not directly address the basis of the sentiments that 
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parents feel towards their children. He does note, however, that children will produce 
a religious effect, which is “most beautiful,”199 in their parents, that the parents will see 
their children as a blessing, a gift from God, and that the father will be humbled and 
will recognize that the child “is a trust and that in the most beautiful sense of the word 
he is only the stepfather,”200 “for God himself has placed [the child] there.”201 Judge 
William’s perspective on the child and how he believes the father views his child 
strongly suggests that he would reject the naturalistic account that Fichte provides of 
parental love: it is hard to see how Judge William could claim that the father sees the 
child as a gift from God while also agreeing with Fichte that the father’s love for his 
child is a general, all-encompassing love that wouldn’t be particularized toward his 
own child but for the father’s love for the mother. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a detailed study and comparison of the views on marriage of Fichte 
and Kierkegaard, showing both what they have in common and where they differ. 
The accounts of both philosophers exemplify deep thinking on marriage, and are 
opposed to a certain current and often tacit understanding of marriage as a matter of 
contracts on utilitarian grounds. 
Fichte’s entire account of the metaphysics of marriage in general, and his 
identification of man with the (relative) I and the woman with the Not-I in particular, 
stem not from any empirical considerations; rather, they allow him to have a theory of 
marriage that can be embedded within his Wissenschaftslehre. While Kosch may be right 
to suggest that in Fichte’s ethics, the practical standpoint is determinative of theoretical 
reason, this does not apply to his account of marriage, motivated as it is by primarily 
theoretical considerations.  
 We also noted that while Fichte and Judge William are both opposed the 
institution of arranged marriages, on Fichte’s account such marriages are immoral 
because of their potential to cheat the women out of love; Fichte is far more sanguine 
when it comes to the question of whether the autonomy of men is compromised under 
such an arrangement. Judge William’s insistence on the importance of love to a 
marriage for both the man and the woman distinguishes his account from Fichte’s. 
More significantly, we saw that Judge William attaches far greater significance to the 
presence of a religious authority in the wedding ceremony than does Fichte. This gets 
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to a more general difference between Judge William and Fichte: for Fichte, marriage is 
an autonomous institution, not grounded in law or theology; for Judge William, the 
presence of a religious authority at the wedding is very important because for him 
marriage is fundamentally a religious institution. What distinguishes a genuine 
marriage, on Judge William view, from some other type of relationship is the 
absorption of the erotic in the relationship into the ethical and religious spheres. Thus, 
for Judge William, marriage is not an autonomous institution, but one mediated by 
God. 
 We saw that the parents’ love for their child, on Fichte’s view, is the product of 
natural drives; on Judge William’s account, any such natural feeling is also 
accompanied by the recognition that children are a gift from God. While Fichte and 
Judge William both believe that the love underlying a marriage is empowered by the 
history of love in the relationship (though Judge William provides a far more intricate 
account of the ‘inner history’ of love), they diverge when it comes to the question of 
what sustains a marriage in times for adversity. For Fichte, the desire to work on and 
preserve a marriage comes from love, and the natural and ethical imperative to 
respond to that love; once that love is gone, the two partners are no longer considered 
married. For Judge William, the imperative to work on a marriage comes from love 
and from the religious nature of the union (i.e., from God), and hence the fading or the 
absence of love is no reason to give up on the marriage.  
Finally, while both Fichte and Judge William agree that marriage contains its telos 
within itself, they differ in that for Fichte, marriage has a priori teloi (unification and 
procreation), while for Judge William there is no such a priori telos to marriage, only 
the blessings and the virtuous development of the self that are recognized after the 
marriage. 
Hence, we see that, despite claims that Kierkegaard’s character Judge William was 
merely following Fichte, there are crucial differences between them, and that the 
former’s views on marriage should be appreciated as original and important, even if 
influenced by the latter. In fact, on the specific issue of marriage within the ethical 
standpoint, I conclude that there are excellent reasons to remain agnostic on whether 
Fichte was Kierkegaard’s historical model. 
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